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In the past twenty years, new optimism about the relevance of Buddhism to cognitive 
science has been expressed by a number of established researchers. In this article I ask what 
are the conceptual roots of this optimism, and which forms of development it inspired, 
with particular focus on selfhood, embodiment and meditation. The latter contains three 
distinct points of contact that are also reviewed: the introduction of first person methods, 
neuroscientific research of meditation, and using meditation in psychotherapy. I argue 
that the dialogue between Buddhism and cognitive science is part of a bigger concern that 
accompanies late modernity since the 19th century regarding the gap between first and 
third person accounts of reality. In particular it taps on a growing discontent with the 
Cartesian outlook on the self and its place in the world. However, while Buddhism and 
cognitive science both reject a similar notion of substantial selfhood, what they offer in 
return is different. It is often overlooked that in Buddhism fact is interwoven with value, 
while in science they are still further apart. This makes the claims about the compatibil-
ity of the two systems somewhat naive, and explains why recently the «dialogue» takes 
the form of neuroscientific research of meditation: work that hardly changes or chal-
lenges the foundations of science. 
Keywords: Cognitive sciences; Buddhism; Neurosciences; Neurophenomenology; Embod-
iment.
Resumen. Lo que el budismo enseñó a las ciencias cognitivas sobre el yo, la mente y el cerebro
En los últimos veinte años, un número de investigadores reconocidos han expresado un 
nuevo optimismo acerca de la relevancia del budismo en relación con la ciencia cognitiva. 
En este artículo, me pregunto cuáles son las raíces conceptuales de este optimismo, y en 
qué formas de desarrollo se inspira, con especial atención a la individualidad, la encarna-
ción (embodiment) y la meditación. Este último contiene tres puntos distintos de contacto 
que sirven también de revisión: la introducción de los métodos de primera persona, la 
investigación neurocientífica de la meditación y la meditación en la psicoterapia. Sostengo 
que el diálogo entre el budismo y la ciencia cognitiva es parte de una preocupación mayor 
que acompaña a la modernidad tardía desde el siglo xix, con respecto a la diferencia entre 
las descripciones de la realidad en primera y tercera persona. En particular se fundamenta 
en un creciente descontento con la perspectiva cartesiana sobre el yo y su lugar en el 
mundo. Sin embargo, mientras que la ciencia cognitiva y el budismo coinciden en recha-
40  Enrahonar 47, 2011 Asaf Federman
zar una noción de individualidad sustancial, lo que ofrecen a cambio es diferente. A menu-
do se pasa por alto que, según el budismo, el hecho se entreteje con el valor, mientras que 
en la ciencia ambos se encuentran claramente diferenciados. Esto hace que las afirmaciones 
sobre la compatibilidad de los dos sistemas resulten un tanto ingenuas, y explica por qué 
actualmente el «diálogo» toma la forma de la investigación neurocientífica de la medita-
ción: es el trabajo que menos cambios o desafíos plantea a las bases de la ciencia.
Palabras clave: ciencias cognitivas; budismo; neurociencias; neurofenomenología; mente 
corporeizada.
If ever there is any religion that would cope with modern scientific  
needs it would be Buddhism. 
(Not) albErt EinstEin
On the Rhetoric of Buddhism and Cognitive Science 
The words in the motto above are taken from a longer quote that is attrib-
uted to Albert Einstein but are most probably not his.1 They appear in a 
number of popular publications, most of which are on the Internet (e.g., 
Niimi, 2002), in a way that begs the question: why authors virally reproduce 
it? A simple answer would be that it rubberstamps the scientific potential of 
Buddhism by attributing it to the most celebrated scientific genius of the 20th 
century. But in most cases, the statement is not reiterated by Buddhists who 
seek to convince a Western skeptic, but by authors who work within a West-
ern cultural context. Whether said by Einstein or not, this statement actually 
captures the gist of a fundamental historical truth about the arrival of Bud-
dhism to the West: Buddhism has been perceived as an ally of science from as 
early as the 19th century, and continues to be so today. 
In 1893, the Buddhist scholar and reformer Anagarika Dharmapala spoke 
to an American audience about Buddhism which is «free from theology, priest-
craft, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, heavens, hells» and is «a scientific religion... 
which is in harmony with geology, astrology, radioactivity and reality». (in 
McMahan, 2004: 906). The historian David McMahan analyzes in detail why 
this rhetoric —which was obviously inaccurate as to the actual practice of Bud-
1. For a more details about the origin of the quote see (Ryan, 2007b) and (Ryan, 2007a).
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dhism in Asia— has been created in the first place. One of his suggestions is 
that Buddhism provided a promise for remedy to a crisis of faith in Victorian 
society: it was naively perceived as a system that provided both spiritual solace 
and scientific rationality, thus bridging the rapidly opening gap between science 
and Christianity. By the beginning of the 21st century, much of the early 
naivety about the prospects of the unification of Buddhism and science has 
been abandoned, although the above mentioned motto reminds us that some 
yearning is perhaps still maintained in the public’s imagination. 
In the past twenty years, new optimism about the relevance of Buddhism to 
cognitive science has been seriously considered by a growing number of estab-
lished researchers.2 This article asks what are the conceptual roots of this opti-
mism, and which forms of developments it inspires. In particular, it looks at 
how «the self» arose as a philosophical focal point for Buddhism and cognitive 
science; at how (and whether) «embodiment» arose as a Buddhist-inspired the-
oretical alternative to classical cognitivism; and at the place of meditation in 
psychological and neuroscientific research. All this is preceded by a review of the 
existing typologies of the evolving relations between Buddhism and science.
Mapping Exercises 
Alongside the evolving interaction between Buddhism and cognitive science 
there have been a number of attempts to map the process itself. These maps 
address both the actual and possible relationships between the two systems 
and are helpful for evaluating the direction of development. It is almost impos-
sible to approach such a mapping exercise without acknowledging the typol-
ogy of relations between religion and science that was suggested by the histo-
rian of religion Ian Barbour (1990). Barbour identified four categories of 
relationship: conflict, independence, dialogue and integration, which represent 
different types of perceived relations between science and religion. 
Conflict is the view that science contradicts religion, and that they are 
mutually exclusive. This view has recently regained some attention with the 
publication of The God Delusion (Dawkins, 2006), but had been vigorously 
stated before (Russell, 1930; Russell, 1935). Independence is the view that 
science and religion exclusively cover different domains that do not overlap. 
Stephen Jay Gould is probably the most known advocate of this view: 
The magisterium of science covers the empirical realm: what the Universe is 
made of (fact) and why does it work in this way (theory). The magisterium of 
religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value. These 
two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they encompass all inquiry. (Gould, 
1999: 6)
2. A non comprehensive list must includes James Austin (1999; 2006), Richard Davidson 
(2008), Christopher deCharms (1997), Daniel Goleman (1991; 1997), Jeremy Hayward 
(1987), Eleanor Rosch (2007), Francisco Varela (1991) and Alan Wallace (2003; 2007; 
2009).
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Dialogue is the view that although religion and science are different, it is 
possible to compare them and to demonstrate that they are analogous in one 
way or another (Barbour, 2002: 350). Integration takes dialogue further to 
claim that analogies actually mean similarities. This may result in establishing 
one system that covers both religious beliefs and scientific theories, or it may 
result in integrating both to create a single entity (ibid.). 
Buddhist scholars pointed out that most of the interaction between Bud-
dhism and science happens within Barbour’s dialogue category, and suggested 
more nuanced distinctions between sub-categories. Richard Payne identified 
three apologetic attitudes to dialogue (Payne, 2002b). The first identifies one 
aspect of Buddhism and shows how it is conducive to science; the second 
claims that Buddhism agrees with scientific methods; the third claims science 
now discovers truths that had been always known in Buddhism. According to 
Payne the rhetoric that accompanies these attitudes covers up a common wish 
to promote Buddhism as a potential correction to science, assuming the supe-
riority of the former. It is interesting to note that most authors who write 
about how Buddhism is conducive to cognitive science, including some of the 
researchers mentioned in footnote 1, run the risk of being interpreted as apol-
ogetic, as if trying to justify the superiority of Buddhism. But according to 
Payne, there can be other more constructive ways of dialoging. In particular 
he mentions naturalizing Buddhist phenomenology, critically examining it by 
the methods of cognitive science, and introducing the Buddhist model of 
cognition as a testable hypothesis. Such a model, he suggests, may provide an 
alternative to a Cartesian model in cognitive science (Payne, 2002a). 
I will return to these suggestions later, in the discussions of particular research 
projects. 
Drawing on Barbour’s work, José Cabezón (2003) suggests another typol-
ogy of relations between Buddhism and science. His typology distinguishes 
between three categories: Conflict/ambivalence; Identity/similarity; and Com-
plementarity. The identity/similarity category overlaps with Payne’s category 
of apologetic dialogue. Like Payne, Cabezón identifies claims about similarities 
in content (Buddhism claims things which are also claimed by science) and 
similarities in method (Buddhist knowledge is achieved by rational or empir-
ical investigation, just like scientific knowledge). In both cases there are good 
reasons to treat these claims with critical caution. Claiming that cognitive 
science has independently discovered what was known in Buddhism for a long 
time may be true but does not go beyond simply stating a remarkable coinci-
dence. Unless careful research manages to explain why and how these coin-
cidences occurred, and in what historical conditions, the mere observation 
means very little. In addition, in many cases what is stated to be identical (e.g., 
karma and evolution), turns out to be false under scrutiny (karma is an ethi-
cally-based metaphysics, evolution is a biological theory). Regarding similari-
ties in method there is a risk of imposing modern categories on pre-modern 
religious system. Although Buddhist scholars point to Buddhism being empir-
ical, rational and non-dogmatic (Jayatilleke, 1963; Jayatilleke, 1971; Hoffman, 
What Buddhism Taught Cognitive Science about Self, Mind and Brain  Enrahonar 47, 2011  43
1987) these do not amount to a fully blown scientific epistemology. As the 
Buddhist scholar Stephen Evans has recently argued, this interpretation of 
Buddhist epistemology is questionable (Evans, 2007; Evans, 2008; Evans, 
2009). 
The most promising area of interaction comes therefore under comple-
mentarity. While advocates of similarity mainly endeavor to eradicate the 
differences between Buddhism and science, those who work under the com-
plementarity assumption acknowledge the differences and seek to bridge over 
them. Cabezón reviews the work of Thurman, Goleman, deCharms, Wallace 
and Wilber and highlights this rhetoric: 
Science deals with matter, Buddhism with mind. Science is the hardware, 
Buddhism the software. Science is rationalist, Buddhism experiential. Science 
is quantitative, Buddhist qualitative. Science is conventional, Buddhism con-
templative. Science advances us materially, Buddhism advances us spiritually. 
(Cabezón, 2003: 50)
Goleman, for example, suggests that the similarities in content are super-
ficial, and that the most interesting interaction between the Buddhist under-
standing of the mind and scientific psychology should exists in relation to their 
methods, which are significantly different (Goleman & Thurman, 1991: 100). 
Different methods bring about different complementary outlooks on human 
development, and thus combining them would lead to richer and fuller under-
standing of the human condition. 
Payne and Cabezón’s typologies, with their discourse analysis pointers, 
are helpful for guiding our attention to pitfalls in interfacing Buddhism and 
science. Without ruling out the potential for genuine mutual enrichment, 
the typologies remind us that many statements about «a dialogue» are in fact 
apologetic claims in disguise. In this light, the following three sections are 
dedicated to examining the grounds on which Buddhism and cognitive sci-
ence meet. They focus on the self, the embodied approach to cognition, and 
meditation.
The Self
Perhaps the most celebrated link between Buddhism and cognitive science is 
their seemingly similar perceptions of self. The Buddhist not-self doctrine 
(Sanskrit: ana¯tman / Pa¯li: anatta¯) is widely acknowledged as the cornerstone 
of Buddhist philosophy, and what makes it both unique and challenging. If 
by «self» one means an eternal entity, like a soul, which exists at the centre of 
being and that defines our true and ultimate identity, most cognitive scientists 
would be happy to adopt a philosophy that denies it. It is not surprising that 
many publications that deal with the philosophical interaction between Bud-
dhist and cognitive science dedicate significant chapters to this topic (e.g., 
Hayward, 1987; Varela, et al., 1991; Watson, et al., 1992; Watson, et al., 
1999; Wallace, 2003). 
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However, one remarkable thing is the effort through which authors need 
to go in order to demonstrate that the content under the headings «no self in 
cognitivism» and «no self in Buddhism» can fuel a meaningful discussion. In 
fact, when confronting the details, most of them cannot avoid admitting the 
discrepancies: 
I envisage that under normal conditions the four stages [of creating the ‘I’ 
though perception]... are less sequentially distinct than the Abhidhamma sys-
tem may suggest. (Lancaster, 1997: 134 slightly abridged)
Although it is recognized that Ordinary Man’s views [about the self] are 
inborn and useful, in some varieties of Buddhist discourse there still seem to 
be some moral opprobrium clinging to these ‘errors’... (Galin, 2003: 132)
For cognitive scientists mental processes, as opposed to contents, are not 
observable, while for Buddhists these may be the objects of meditation. 
(Watson, et al., 1992: 14)
These lines are cited here not to say that Buddhism and cognitive science 
are in complete disagreement, but that sweeping statements about similarities 
can be misleading. A statement like «the views of self in contemporary West-
ern discourses in philosophy and science do no seem inimical to that of Bud-
dhism» (Watson, 1999: 37) may be true but is logically weak. It means that 
on the face of it, scientists would not object to the image of illusory, disinte-
grated and non-substantial self that is found in most Buddhist traditions. It 
would be more difficult, however, to establish a real connection between the 
specifics of each side’s perspectives. To take two examples, the epistemological 
importance of holding no views about the existence of the self (Thanissaro-
Bhikkhu, 1996) has no counterpart in cognitive science, and the detailed 
cognitive-philosophical account of self as a layered brain-dependent process 
that evolved for the sake of self-monitoring (Metzinger, 2003) cannot be 
found in Buddhism. 
The literature on «not-self» in Buddhism and cognitive science is usually not 
dedicated to showing how the details of the Buddhist world-view directly con-
tributes to science, or vise versa. In a more gentle way, it usually «bends» the two 
traditions toward each other to explain one’s philosophy with the language of 
the other. A typical chapter on the subject would describe one philosophy first, 
and then explain how the other may relate to it. As much as any cross-cultural 
study of concepts, the outcome is usually intellectually fascinating, but in most 
cases there are no immediate implications for the scientific study of cognition. 
On the other hand, such exercises in comparative philosophy are important for 
naturalizing Buddhist views, and weeding out those perceptions which clearly 
do not stand the test of empirical cognitive science. 
A rather neglected article by the psychologist Brian Lancaster (1997) uses 
the Abhidhamma model of perception as a solution to the binding problem. 
As this is one of the finest examples of using Buddhist philosophy in cognitive 
science, and a rare one too, I will briefly summarize its main argument. 
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Lancaster takes the general idea of interfacing Buddhism and cognitive 
science one step further by calling upon a particular Buddhist theory —that 
of the Pa¯li Abhidhamma— and by applying it to a particular issue in cogni-
tive science, namely, the function of memory within the «binding problem». 
The binding problem in cognitive science is defined in the following way: 
«How does the information initially processed by a multitude of independ-
ent modular systems become integrated into coherent representations for 
perception, memory, and action?» (Revonsuo & Newman, 1999). Put sim-
ply, Lancaster answers that there is a semblance of coherent representations, 
but they are not, in fact, representing any real existences of a coherent self. 
He suggests an operational model to explain how this may happen, espe-
cially in relations to how information is integrated into coherent representa-
tion in memory. 
In this model perception is a process by which preliminary sensory analy-
sis activates related memory models. The self, or the ‘I’, is one of those mod-
els, and is activated in all cases that lead to explicit memory which will be 
available for conscious recall. Lancaster suggests that after an item has been 
perceptually identified, a «self model» is attached to it. He calls this attachment 
«I»-tag (p. 131), because it tags, as it were, the encoded memory with relation 
to the self-model that «owns» it. 
«I» tagging is therefore crucial for explicit memory, because it contexual-
izes the memory in relation to the most active model («I»), thus enabling a 
quick recall. On the other hand implicit memory (a type of memory in which 
the individual’s behaviour is influenced by previous experiences without being 
conscious of them) is explained in this model as memory without «I»-tagging 
(p.133). In these cases the perceptual process is incomplete, and though iden-
tification is achieved, there is no linking between the percept and the self-
model. So far, this is one model in cognitive science that may or may not be 
verified by empirical research. But its inspiration came directly from the model 
of perception suggested in the Abhidhamma. 
Lancaster suggests that «I»-tagging is similar to what is called in the Abhid-
hamma «slight» (paritta) object in the conscious process (v ı¯thicitta).3 «I» 
—Tagging happens rather late in the perceptual process, only after the percept 
has been identified in relation with other stored memories. This means that 
with any process that reaches this stage, the self model is reinforced, and pos-
sibly amended. Although Lancaster does not mention this, this theory may 
explain why a short masked stimulus influences behaviour while being inac-
cessible to explicit recall— it was not «I» tagged and therefore was not incor-
porated into the self-model. Self, therefore, is understood in this theory as an 
ever arising, ever changing model that constantly amends itself in relation to 
new interpreted sensory input. It is the very model that links the other mod-
els, to create the impression of unified agency. There is no observer-self to 
3. For more details about the Buddhist model see p. 159 and onward in Narada & Bodhi 
(2000). 
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which experiences are represented, but a model of ownership that is main-
tained from moment to moment. In Lancaster’s words: 
«I» is not preexisting entity awaiting —as it were— the opportunity to know 
the percept; rather it arises as a contextually determined feature in the overall 
responses ensuing from stimulation of the sense organ. (Lancaster, 1997: 137)
This point, as much as the overall analysis of cognition, not only resem-
bles the Abhidhamma analysis of the cognition, but also is consciously influ-
enced by it. Lancaster dedicates a section of the article to a generally accurate 
description of the Buddhist position (Lancaster, 1997: 125-9), and another 
to discussing the merit of a mature dialogue with it (p. 133-8). To his cred-
it, the Buddhist position is not simply taken at face value. In relation to the 
Buddhist momentariness doctrine, for example, it is even rejected (p. 134). 
The Buddhist description of the cognitive process identifies several consecu-
tive and distinct stages, and even suggests that what seems parallel (like hear-
ing and seeing at the same time) is in fact a result of serial processing.4 It is 
generally accepted in cognitive science that it is the other way around: cogni-
tion depends on many parallel functions rather than a line of sequential events. 
Even what seems like a linear process (logical reasoning would be an example) 
is a result of many parallel processes. To use an expression by the philosopher 
Daniel Dennett conscious human minds are «more-or-less serial virtual 
machines implemented —inefficiently— on the parallel hardware that evolu-
tion has provided for us». (Dennett, 1993a: 218). Lancaster rejects this Abhid-
hammic outlook on the seriality of cognition, but sees a potential in the 
overall Buddhist perspective on the binding problem. 
This attitude to Buddhist philosophy is a perfect example for Payne’s con-
structive dialogue category. The Buddhist view inspires a cognitive model, which 
in turn yields new hypotheses that can be empirically tested (for example the 
link between self perception and memory recall). Whatever does not fit within 
scientific knowledge (momentariness, serial processing) is left out. This of course 
sets a very clear hierarchical relation between the two participants in the dia-
logue. Buddhism can inspire, but the final word is that of science.5 
We may now turn to a more fundamental question about the understand-
ing of the self in Buddhism and cognitive science. Despite some apparent 
similarities, the ethical and soteriological nature of the Buddhist project is 
often undermined in contemporary cognitive science. The Abhidhamma 
4. Things are in fact more complicated. For example, in the Pali Abhidhamma, each men-
tal event (citta) of the serial cognitive process is accompanied by many cognitive factors 
(cetasika¯) that arise simultaneously with it. In any case, the model is significantly different 
from models in cognitive science. 
5. In the case of parallel versus serial processing there is some room for charitable speculation. 
It may be that the Abhidhamma model does not describe the relations between underlying 
cognitive processes (serial) and their conscious manifestation (parallel). It may describe 
the relations between everyday phenomenology, which involves parallel experiences, and 
meditative phenomenology, which is more likely to bring about sequential experiences. 
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is part of a larger project of re-conditioning the mind to see that there is no 
coherent or singular self. But in sharp contrast to cognitive science, this is not 
the end product of an empirical project but a starting point of an ethical 
project. Nevertheless, the idea that a stable and continuing self is a semblance 
looks surprisingly similar in both sides of the dialogue. I suggest that what 
triggers the interest on both sides is a conceptual structure of rejecting a par-
ticular kind of self. These rejections, which are directed towards the Cartesian 
and the Brahmanical perceptions of self, create a gap that needs to be filled. 
Although the act of rejecting, the process of divorcing from a previous concept 
of substantial selfhood, is similar in both Buddhism and cognitive science, the 
actual content that fills the gap is different. 
Acknowledging this —that Buddhism and cognitive science are situated 
on similar ends of paradigm shifts— can explain the difficulties that arise with 
bringing together the two systems’ views of selfhood. Both systems are united 
in rejecting the idea of an eternal immaterial soul that is separated from the 
body, and yet controls it from within.6 But this is more or less where the 
similarities end. Buddhism rejects a kind of self (a¯tman) which is eternal, bliss-
ful, and identical with the creative force of the universe (Brahman). It identi-
fies the attachment to such a self as a source of misery, and thus provides 
logical considerations (philosophy) and practical exercises (meditation, moral-
ity) as antidotes. The prime motivation is therefore ethical and is part of a 
larger soteriological system. Cognitive science, on the other hand, lacks both 
the ethical motivation and the practical application. Its rejection of the Car-
tesian self is a result of scientific theorizing that emerges from experimental 
work. Descartes’ Error, as the neurologist Antonio Damasio puts it, was not 
ethical but ontological: reason and emotion are not separated faculties, and 
the mind is not incorporeal (Damasio, 1994). 
There is, however, another level of complication here. In Buddhism the 
ethical dimension is always within a hand-reach distance from the factual 
assertions. Upholding a self-theory is both morally wrong (it brings about 
continuous existence in misery) and factually wrong (such self cannot be 
found). This connection between fact and value is of course common to other 
pre-modern systems and, if to believe Alasdair MacIntyre, was lost with mod-
ernism (MacIntyre, 1984). This may begin to explain why cognitive scientists 
usually look at the «factual» aspect of the Buddhist perspective (e.g., the «mod-
els» in the Abhidhamma), and do not hurry to adopt the otherwise insepara-
ble soteriological perspective. 
Embodiment 
The history of the embodied approach in cognitive science (sometimes mis-
leadingly called Embodied Cognitive Science) is woven with Buddhist links 
and references. The embodied approach emerged from the criticism of the 
6. I have demonstrated it in some length in my PhD thesis (Federman, 2008). 
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first ‘classical’ phase in cognitive science which focused on computation and 
disembodied Artificial Intelligence. Although the first phase of cognitive sci-
ence re-introduced the mind as an object of research (following a period of 
mind-denying Radical Behaviourism), many researchers worked with the 
assumption that a computational-mechanical explanation would be sufficient 
for explaining and replicating intelligence.7 Gradually, however, critics have 
pointed out that there were empirical loopholes and theoretical problems in 
this approach. On the philosophical level it seemed to have preserved some-
thing of the Cartesian model: the mind was seen as a device of logical ration-
ality and was perceived as being isolated and situated against a world that 
needs to be internally represented.8 A number of empirical results and theo-
retical considerations indicated that a sound theory of cognition and its rep-
lication in artificial intelligence could not be fully achieved within this classi-
cal cognitive framework. There were indications that perception, language, 
thought and consciousness are fundamentally embedded in living bodies and 
in their relations with their environments. 
Although the conditions for moving into a second phase in cognitive sci-
ence matured through debates within the scientific community, early articula-
tions of both criticism and the alternatives were raised in connection with 
Buddhism. The idea that the mind is a living and embodied entity, not a 
disembodied reasoning mechanism, has been expressed in the Buddhist 
inspired Shifting Worlds Changing Minds (Hayward, 1987), and more so in 
The Embodied Mind (Varela, et al., 1991). Hayward, Varela, Thomson and 
Rosch all drew on existing discussions in cognitive science and endeavored to 
link them to aspects of Buddhist philosophy and practice. The Embodied Mind 
became a classic in the philosophy of cognitive science and is widely cited. 
The question that concerns us here is the actual Buddhist contribution to 
the development of the embodied approach that is suggested in The Embodied 
Mind. The authors call for a revolution in cognitive science and bring forward 
a radical critique of the state of affairs. Their criticism is directed at the 
assumed division between an independently existing «external» world of objects 
and events, and their «internal» representation in the symbolic computational 
environment of the brain or mind. They suggest that both scientific findings 
and Buddhist thought challenge this idea and suggest an alternative. 
The alternative consists of an «enactive» account in which mind is embod-
ied, not detached, and the «world» is being created and is not pregiven. This 
7. Main players included the Computation Theory of Mind (CTM) and Fodor’s Language 
of Thought (LOT) hypothesis. The success of this type of AI research is usually illustrated 
by the creation of chess-playing computers, and many other content-specific problem solv-
ing devices. Failures of this approach are usually in the area of language and perception. 
For more details see Horst, Clark, and Bechtel (Bechtel, et al., 1998; Clark, 2001; Horst, 
2005). 
8. Early critics included the psychologist James Gibson, the philsohper Hubert Dreyfus and to 
some extent John Searle. (see Dreyfus, 1979; Gibson, 1979; Searle, 1980; and for review: 
Bechtel, et al., 1998; Clark, 1999; Clark, 2001; Horst, 2005).
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insight, they suggest, cannot be fully achieved without exercising «mindful-
ness», a practice directly absorbed from Buddhism, which will cause the 
practitioner «to experience what one’s mind is doing as it does it» (Varela, et 
al., 1991: 23). In other words, mindfulness meditation is the missing phe-
nomenological link in cognitive science; it is a method for exploring and 
knowing what human experience is. This conception, that Buddhist mindful-
ness meditation is a valid scientific tool for investigating experience, appears 
also in Shifting Worlds Changing Minds (Hayward, 1987: 192-194), and is 
echoed in later discussions (Rosch, 1997), and more recently in the writing 
of Alan Wallace.9 
Is it true that the «revolution» suggested in The Embodied Mind entailed 
a Buddhist input? Looking backwards on this publication, it is clear that the 
embodied approach in cognitive science was part of a bigger movement that 
was promoted by thinkers who had no affinity with Buddhist thought. Almost 
simultaneously with the Embodied Mind, Daniel Dennett published his Con-
sciousness Explained that contains similar critique of the Cartesian residue 
in classical cognitive science and suggests an alternative (Dennett, 1993a). In 
fact, it contains a very embodied or «enactivist» account of consciousness.10 
Varela et al indeed drive home the urgent need to include phenomenology, 
and the shortfalls of the phenomenological tradition in Western philosophy. 
But this played only a minor role in exposing the problems of classical cogni-
tivism, and the re-framing of the philosophical landscape. In other words, the 
development of the embodied mind paradigm in cognitive science does not 
owe as much as one may wish to Buddhism. As far as I can tell, the «revolu-
tion» of The Embodied Mind did not lead to cognitive scientists radically 
changing their research methods, nor did it led to replacing materialism with 
mindfulness-based phenomenology. Perhaps it is better to see the changes as 
a reform of the scientific problem space (Dennett, 1993b): including the body 
and the environment when accounting for cognition. In the next sub-section 
I expand on a particular call for a paradigm shift in cognitive science through 
the method of neurophenomenology. 
Meditation research 
Meditation research includes several different projects that can be sorted under 
three headings. First, mindfulness meditation inspires the development of 
neurophenomenology. Second, neurological research investigates the physi-
ological correlates of meditation. Third, cognitive research assesses the appli-
cability and function of meditation in clinical settings.
 9. For example, «What’s been hidden is meditation’s role as a precision tool for exploring 
consciouness and the universe scientifically—that is, using empirical methods similar to 
those intrinsic to the scientific method (Wallace, 2009: 1).
10. Heaving read The Embodied Mind Dennett contemplates the possibility of his being an 
enactivist without realizing it (Dennett, 1993b).
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Neurophenomenology: Changing paradigms in cognitive research? 
Classical cognitivism did not forsake the older «behaviouristic» aspiration 
to objective experimentation in psychology, but rejected the idea that 
behaviour can be fully explained by studying only environmental condi-
tions. Instead of studying behaviour as if there were no cognitive states 
that related to it, researchers began to be interested in the states of the 
internal «machinery». It is important to note that the materialistic and 
mechanistic framework of behaviourism survived this transition. There 
was nothing in the new paradigm that suggested non-mechanical under-
standing of human behaviour. However, it did offer a new mechanical 
account of human behaviour that did not exclude the «internal» states 
of the «thinking machine».
Critics of classical cognitivism pointed out that the internal states 
accounted for are still far removed from the experience of mental states. 
Being materialistic, they say, cognitive science is too focused on third-person 
descriptions of cognition and the brain, and ignores the very fact that human 
beings seem to have private phenomenological worlds that include thoughts, 
emotions, wishes, sensations, perceptions and so on. The problem of 
explaining how a physical system, like the brain, gives rise to phenomenal 
experience is described by philosophers as the Hard Problem (Chalmers, 
1995). One solution to this problem was brought forwards by Francisco 
Varela, one of the authors of The Embodied Mind, who was explicitly influ-
enced by what he understood to be a Buddhist practice of mindfulness 
(Varela, 1996). 
Varela’s suggestion, which he called neurophenomenology, was to take first-
person experience as irreducible to anything else, and to develop a rigorous 
method for its exploration. Buddhist meditation is the prime inspiration of 
the idea of a rigorous method for exploring the phenomenal world (Varela, et 
al., 1991: 23-31). Neurophenomenology seeks to marry this specialized first-
person investigation with research in cognitive science. At the heart of this 
suggestion lies the potential of utilizing trained attention to improve observa-
tion and report of first person experiences. Another aspect is creating an agreed 
formalized language for describing whatever is revealed by this type of atten-
tion (Varela, 1996). 
What was the impact of this suggestion on cognitive science? It would be 
hard to say that neurophenomenology has created a revolution in the study 
of conscious experience, although it definitely inspired a number of interesting 
research studies (Lutz, 2002; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Cosmelli & Thomp-
son, 2007; Lutz, 2007; Christoffa, et al., 2009). It seems that neurophenom-
enology contains two aspects that are, to some extent, independent. First, it 
puts forward the realization that without accounting for subjective experi-
ences cognitive science would be held back. Cognitive science, it is suggested, 
should address them directly, from the first-person perspective. The second 
aspect of neurophenomenology is an ontological claim about the irreducibil-
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ity of these states. Both aspects work fine within the framework of the Hard 
Problem, and indeed it received a rather positive response from Chalmers 
himself (Chalmers, 1997). Chalmers does remain skeptical, however, about 
the accuracy of mindfulness as an experimental tool because «the mere act of 
attention to one’s experience transforms that experience» (Chalmers, 1997: 
44). Unless one argues that attention is somehow outside experience, one must 
accept that different kinds or levels of attention stand for different experi-
ences, and at a final account there is no way of being mindful without induc-
ing some changes to mood, clarity, concentration, thoughts or emotions. In 
other words, attention training itself changes the quality of experience. 
In the context of classical cognitive science, neurophenomenology looks 
radical, because it shies away from the scientific tendency to focus on third-
person data, primarily in the form of behavioural outputs and physiological 
measurements. But it is not exclusive in suggesting that subjective experience 
should not be excluded. Dennett, who insists that the Hard Problem is coun-
terproductive and not real (Dennett, 1996), nonetheless suggests that science 
should take into account first-person data. He proposes to approach the phe-
nomenal reports of subjects through a method that he calls «heterophenom-
enology» (Dennett, 2003). On the conceptual level this is the exact opposite 
of neurophenomenology, because it is about the experience of the other (het-
ero), not of one’s own experience. Dennett proposes to treat the introspective 
reports of others as if they were fiction, and suspend judgment (potentially 
forever) on whether they are really about conscious states. Introspective reports 
in this case are taken to be expressions of beliefs about subjective experience, 
not reports of anything that have special ontological status. Although this 
seems to directly contradict the working assumption of neurophenomenology, 
which takes subjective experience as fundamentally real, Tjeerd van de Laar 
has recently shown that in practice there is no different between the two 
approaches (van de Laar, 2008). The heterophenomenologist could always 
describe the data generated by participants’ reports in terms of their sincere 
beliefs, correlating with third-person data from, for example, EEG or fMRI 
measurements, with, or without, taking seriously the ontology of phenomenal 
facts suggested by these reports. The difference between hetero— and neuro-
phenomenologies is more a matter of preferred ontology and is a question that 
cannot be settled on the basis of empirical research.
Neurophenomenology was indeed part of a shift towards a more phenom-
enologically-aware research in cognitive science. It’s Buddhist inspired ontol-
ogy, however, did not emerge as an accepted alternative to the scientific mate-
rialism. 
A final word about neurophenomenology should be said in regard to the 
training of attention. The assumption here is that it is possible, with train-
ing, to establish mindfulness that observes experience without changing it. 
I have mentioned above that Chalmers objects to the idea of bias-free mind-
fulness, but this does not mean that training participants should be ruled 
out altogether. The idea that some training is required to improve partici-
52  Enrahonar 47, 2011 Asaf Federman
pants’ reports of their experiences is even accepted by the materialist Den-
nett.11 In neurophenomenology, however, the proposal is more radical than 
that. Here, experience is considered irreducible. Mindfulness is said to have 
privileged access to this realm and can therefore make real discoveries. Learn-
ing how to meditate is taken to be a process that clears biases and prevents 
distortions. Subjective reports in this case are accounts of something real, 
not just utterances of subjective beliefs.12 
It would be interesting to investigate to what extent this assertion applies 
in Buddhism. Is mindfulness meditation taken to be an empirical tool? The 
apologetic attitudes mentioned in the beginning of this article come to hand. 
The claims that Buddhist practice is scientific or empirical is a descendent of 
the «scientific Buddhism» discourse of Anagarika Dharmapala (McMahan, 
2004) and is found elsewhere on the Buddhist side of the dialogue (Jayat-
illeke, 1971; Hoffman, 1987). As I already mentioned it has been recently 
challenged in a series of articles by the Buddhist scholar Stephen Evans (Evans, 
2007; Evans, 2009). 
In the case of «Mindfulness meditation», one should be reminded that in 
Buddhism it has always been part of a bigger project of transforming the mind. 
Even contemporary Buddhist Scholars, like the scientists-monk Matthieu 
Ricard, discuss meditation training as something that helps to «examine in 
depth the nature of the mind» in order to «liberate ourselves from the yoke of 
the ego and ignorance» (Ricard, 2003: 263). This is another reminder of how 
ethics and ontology are connected in Buddhism. Indeed re-uniting them 
within the scientific discourse would entail a revolution in our perception of 
truth, value and virtue. There is little doubt that this has not yet happened. 
Neuroscientific research on meditation
Without aiming to challenge and change the entire scientific project, medita-
tion research uses meditation as an aid for exploring the physiological corre-
lates of certain types of cognition, and for achieving better understanding of 
what meditation is. This is by far the most proliferate field of investigation, 
especially since the maturation of two conditions: progress and availability of 
brain imaging technologies, and the presence of experienced meditators in the 
West. It is estimated that there have been more than 80 research publications 
on Buddhist meditation in neuroscience in the past 10 years, and more than 
300 when including psychology and behavioural sciences in the search.13 
11. «For instance, it [training] might in some circumstances heighten the powers of subjects 
to articulate or otherwise manifest their subjectivity to investigators». (Dennett, 2003: 21)
12. Varela et al ask: «Can mindfulness/awareness meditation be considered a kind of experi-
mentation that makes discoveries about the nature and behavior of mind...?» (Varela et al., 
1991: 31). A positive reply follows.
13. Estimation is based on searching ISI Web of Knowledgesm database (www.isiknowledge.com 
accessed 17 Sept. 2009) with the term «meditation», limited by the appearance of one of 
the following words in the Topic category: Buddh*, Vipassana, Mindfulness, Shamatha, 
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The conceptual framework of this type of research is not complicated. It 
basically involves collecting and analyzing physiological and behavioural data 
from meditating participants before, during or after meditation sessions, and 
comparing them with control groups. In some cases phenomenological data is 
collected as well, in order to enrich results with meditators’ first-person perspec-
tives. This does not mean, however, that all researchers work under the onto-
logical assumptions of neurophenomenoly. On the contrary, some influential 
studies are designed without measures of self-reporting, all the more so without 
references to an irreducibility of conscious experiences (Lazar et al., 2005; 
JhA et al., 2007). Other studies do refer to phenomenological data, although 
these references are used to justify further objective measurements (Lutz et al., 
2004). 
Studying meditation with neuroscientific methods takes part in a main-
stream research project in cognitive science. Researchers use meditators as a 
valuable resource of otherwise hard-to-get data. Adept meditators devote 
many hours —sometimes a lifetime— to developing a narrow cognitive 
repertoire. This fact in itself creates an opportunity for investigating wheth-
er these practices induce long lasting neural changes, and may contribute to 
identifying neural correlates of certain self-induces cognitions. By no means 
does meditation have a privileged contribution to this type of neuroscien-
tific interest. Similar studies on other kinds of training, in particular juggling 
and navigation, have famously provided similar insights on brain plasticity 
(Maguire et al., 2000; Draganski et al., 2004). Meditation research joins 
them in showing how self-induced mental states can change functional 
measurement (Lutz et al., 2004) and lead to long-term structural changes 
in the brain (Lazar et al., 2005; Davidson & Lutz, 2008; Luders et al., 
2009). The unique angle of these findings is the fact that, unlike juggling 
balls or driving cabs in London, «self-induced mental states» do not involve 
observable behaviours.14 
Because meditation involves first-person experiences with little or no 
behavioural indicators there is little doubt that verbal descriptions are neces-
sary for evaluating what participants are actually doing. The need to describe 
meditative practices in cognitive-behavioural terms led researchers to collabo-
rate with Buddhist scholars in developing common descriptive standards. The 
need for a common operational definition has been stated recently by the 
Samatha. Search was also limited by publication dates: 2000-2009; and by the following 
subject areas: Psychology (270 results), Behavioral Sciences (261 results), and Neuroscience 
& Neurology (80 results). Total results returned with all parameters: 316. (for comparison 
searching «neurophenomenology» returns 29 results). Search String: Topic=(meditation) 
AND Topic=(Buddh* OR vipassana OR mindfulness OR shamatha OR samatha) AND Year 
Published=(2000-2009) Refined by: Subject Areas=(PSYCHOLOGY OR BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES OR NEUROSCIENCES & NEUROLOGY). A similar search for the years 
1990-1999 returns 30 results, 8 of which are in neuroscience. 
14. This too may not be entirely unique. There are indications that actual and imagined 
movements possess similar neural substrates (Lotze et al., 1999). 
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neuroscientists Antoine Lutz and Richard Davidson and the Buddhist schol-
ar John Dunne (Lutz et al., 2007). By reviewing three Buddhist practices that 
have received scientific attention, and by referring to traditional Tibetan tax-
onomies, they describe the cognitive differences between three types of med-
itative practices: focused attention, open presence, and non-referential com-
passion. Here, neuroscience joins forces with scholarship in the search for a 
better understanding of what meditation is. When this end is achieved, each 
type of meditation may be used to investigate its neural correlates thus provid-
ing a richer description of traditional taxonomies, and better understanding 
of neural structures. 
Meditation research begins to naturalize traditional practices and describe 
them with physiological and functional terminology. Amishi Jha (2007), for 
example, draws on existing neuroscientific distinctions between dorsal and 
ventral subsystems of attention, and examine how they may be involved in 
different kinds of mindfulness practices. In her study she compared inexperi-
enced participants who underwent an eight-week Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction course (MBSR, see below) and experienced practitioners who 
underwent one-month intensive mindfulness retreat. She found that both 
groups improved attentional functions that are associated with the dorsal sys-
tem. (This means that both groups improved top-down attention control: the 
ability to deliberately direct attention to objects of choice.) She also found that 
experienced participants who underwent one-month mindfulness retreat sig-
nificantly improved their ability for attention readiness and attention to exog-
enous stimulus detection comparing with the first group. These results (if 
replicated) may indicate that intensive mindfulness retreats and weekly mind-
fulness course induce different attentional skills, regardless of their common 
titles as ‘mindfulness’ trainings. Further on, this may also feed back into 
debates within Buddhist communities about the different types of concentra-
tive awareness, and into therapeutic debates about the efficacy of meditative 
trainings. 
Psychotherapeutic research on meditation
In the past 20 years there has been an unprecedented increase in empirical 
research on meditation-as-therapy. This research typically seeks to establish 
whether mindfulness meditation is beneficial for treating or preventing cer-
tain conditions (e.g., stress, depression, eating disorders, cancer & addiction, 
for review and meta-analysis see Baer, 2003; Grossman et al., 2004). Most 
of it can be seen as stemming from the work in the Stress Reduction Clinic 
in the University of Massachusetts in which Jon Kabat-Zin and colleagues 
developed the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction programme (MBSR). 
This is an eight-week programme that includes 2.5 hours weekly sessions 
and daily home practice of about an hour, in which participants learn to 
develop «mindfulness». In MBSR «mindfulness» is described as «paying 
attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
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judgmentally» (Kabat-Zinn, 1994: 4). While clinical results are considered 
to be promising, researchers are still investigating the underlying cognitive 
functioning of the training.15 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) is similar to MBSR but 
contains additional components of cognitive therapy for depression. It has been 
shown to be effective in preventing relapse in patients who had three or more 
episodes of major depression before the intervention (Teasdale et al., 2000; 
Segal et al., 2002). The efficacy of this preventive intervention is linked to an 
information-processing theory of depressive relapse that was developed inde-
pendently of any Buddhist theory by John Teasdale and Philip Barnard (Bar-
nard & Teasdale, 1991). A central aspect of this model is the recognition that 
certain automatic thought processes that are reinforced in a depression episode, 
maintain the episode, and reinforce negative cognitive models that increase the 
likelihood of a proceeding episode. Thus the potential for relapse increases with 
each episode. The problem is that cognitive models that are developed in 
depression tend to be themselves depressogenic, thus causing further depres-
sion. In other words, over thinking about depression, or «feeling bad» about it, 
reinforces the depression itself. 
In 1995 Teasdale and colleagues identified MBSR as potential intervention 
that may be able to break the vicious cognitive cycle of depression relapse. 
They indicate that focusing the attention on particular objects (like the breath) 
use the resources that are otherwise «necessary to support depression-enhanc-
ing or depression-maintaining processing cycles». (Teasdale et al., 1995). In 
this way the «central engine» of depression weakens. In addition, depression 
is associated with a cognitive tendency to entertain ineffective but uncon-
trolled problem-solving strategies, which are bound to fail and to reinforce 
negative self-perceptions. The principle of «acknowledgement and acceptance» 
of mental states in MBSR comes handy in dismantling the efficacy of these 
ineffective cognitions. Instead of trying to solve depression, patients learn to 
de-centre from it. Mindfulness practice goes beyond the cognitive therapeutic 
principle of «coping and controlling» and introduce «non-doing» as a preferred 
mode. Finally, the emphasis on relating to thoughts and emotions as momen-
tary impersonal phenomena, rather than realities («there is pain», instead of 
«I am in pain») weakens the need for urgent action that is identified in 
Teasedale’s cognitive model as contributor for the depressive cycle. 
A new preventive therapy package was developed from these considera-
tions. Initially, Attentional Control Training (ACT) combined cognitive 
therapy and training in attention control, but was subsequently replaced by 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), which incorporated most of 
the original MBSR training programme with additional cognitive therapy 
15. The most recent research project to ask how mindfulness works in preventing relapse of 
major depression is «Preventing depressive relapse/recurrence in NHS settings through 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) – acronym PREVENT». See University of 
Exeter Mood Disorder Centre http://centres.exeter.ac.uk/mood/research.php (last accessed 
18 Sept. 2009) and http://www.hta.ac.uk/project/1924.asp (last accessed 14 Jan 2011).
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elements for depression (Segal et al., 2002). Here is an interesting instance of 
scientific work enhanced by Buddhist input. The clinical success of MBCT 
in relapse prevention (Teasdale et al., 2000; Segal et al., 2002) validates 
Teasedale’s earlier cognitive model (Teasdale et al., 1995) and helps to iden-
tify more clearly the cognitive risk factors in major depressions relapse. 
There is, however, something problematic in this heroic conclusion. To 
what extent is MBCT Buddhist? It is difficult to deny that it was inspired by 
Buddhist practice, but in many respects it has already completed a long proc-
ess of integration into a Western and modern discourse. Some Buddhists 
scholars criticize the definitions of mindfulness as paying attention on pur-
pose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally (e.g., Wallace, 2006; 
Dunne, 2008). Even traditional sources seem to diverge from that. The 
descriptions of mindfulness in the Satipattha¯na-sutta, for example, prescribe 
a set of cognitive frameworks, or «judgments», through which the meditator 
learns to interpret reality.16 Although the meditator learns to disengage from 
the phenomenal world, he does endeavor to develop a particular perspective 
on it. This should come as no surprise when we are reminded that in Bud-
dhism the distinction between fact and value is not as sharp as in modern 
science. For Buddhists mindfulness helps the meditator to see the world in a 
particular way: as devoid of selfhood, as transient, and as unsatisfactory. It is 
not an exercise in acceptance, but in self-induced change. Moreover, although 
it is concerned with «suffering», it is not directly concerned with what clini-
cians call depression, and is not satisfied with «normality» as its solution. But 
perhaps the fact that Buddhist meditation centers in Europe and the US offer 
retreats on MBSR and MBCT tell us that the living Buddhist traditions in 
the West are quite receptive to change. 
Conclusion
The interaction between Buddhism and cognitive science has two major 
aspects. The first is a challenge to the Western scientific world-view, and more 
specifically to certain assumptions with classical cognitive science. The dia-
logue here has been part of a long history of «scientific Buddhism» although 
it certainly does not confine itself to claims of similarities between Buddhism 
and science. Nevertheless, something of the original apologetic nature remains 
intact when certain authors bring forward Buddhism as a remedy or justifica-
tion for advocated change in science. The idea that classical cognitivism is an 
inadequate framework for explaining intelligent behaviour is now part of the 
widely accepted embodied paradigm. But to what extent Buddhism contrib-
uted to this paradigm shift? Two radical suggestions inspired by Buddhism 
16. «...finally he [the meditator] learns to be aware of dhamma¯ (plural). This has been rendered 
as ‘his thoughts’. But the dhamma¯ that the text spells out are in fact the teachings of the 
Buddha, such as the four noble truths. The meditator moves from thinking about those 
teachings to thinking with them: he learns (to use an anachronistic metaphor) to see the 
world through Buddhist spectacles». (Gombrich, 1996: 35-6).
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—that phenomenology is irreducible, and that mindfulness is an unbiased 
research tool— did not enter main stream scientific thought. The milder sug-
gestions that the computational-representational assumption is insufficient, 
and that a more ecological approach to cognition is required, developed large-
ly independently of Buddhist input. 
It is perhaps better to look at the published work on this subject from a 
different angle. The Buddhist inspired «revolution» was part of a more general 
concern about modernity and science, and in particular a growing discontent 
with the Cartesian world-view that pervaded many quarters of scientific think-
ing. This was not purely a matter of scientific accuracy (although there were 
precisely theoretical problems with empirical results as well) but a concern that 
materialistic science fails to explain the human condition in a meaningful way. 
To some extent Buddhism had the same function here as in turn-of-the-cen-
tury Victorian imagination: a perceived bridge over the gap between human 
experience and the image portrayed by science. Although this has rarely been 
acknowledged, if at all, what enables this function is the fact-value fabric of 
Buddhism. From the scientific point of view, Buddhism brings extra value, and 
from the ethical point of view it brings (apparent) empirical credibility. 
Interesting observations about the contribution of Buddhist thought 
to cognitive science always involve acknowledgment of the difference 
between the two systems. Exercises in comparative philosophy expose sub-
stantial differences between Buddhist and scientific metaphysics, motiva-
tions, and therefore their «problem spaces». They expose, for example, that 
the approach to selfhood in Buddhism is embedded within a wider ethical 
and soteriological concern, while cognitive science is motivated by curios-
ity and usually remains silent about ethics. As of today, the ethical dimen-
sion in science is confined to «ethical committees» which are certainly not 
interested in the liberation of the scientist’s mind. The idea of «liberation» 
is confined to political thought and some strands of psychotherapy. If there 
has ever been a project of re-marrying fact and value in Western thought 
it has definitely not matured. 
The second aspect of the interaction between Buddhism and cognitive sci-
ence is more limited in scope, but has already brought promising immediate 
results. Meditation research makes use of data from adept mediators to further 
our understanding of both meditation and the neurological or cognitive struc-
tures associated with it. Data from neuroimaging research on meditation sup-
ports the reintroduction of brain plasticity in neuroscience. There is nothing 
conceptually challenging in this research, it simply makes use of otherwise dif-
ficult to obtain data from unique subjects. Another strand of research, how-
ever, tries to naturalize meditation practices and explain in cognitive terms what 
meditators do. In many respects, this is an exercise in translation, and as such 
it forces more nuanced distinctions, more accurate terminologies, and in gen-
eral, richer descriptions of ancient practices. Undoubtedly, new interpretations 
and insight into the different practices will join the long-standing taxonomical 
literature on meditation within the Buddhist tradition. 
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